1. An adult Gentile is warned about the prohibition of theft.[1] This applies to one who forcefully robs or secretly steals money or any movable property, or kidnaps a person, or withholds the wages of his employee or other similar acts, and even to an employed harvester who eats from his employer's produce without permission. For all such acts, a Gentile is liable for a capital sin,[2] and one who commits any of these types of transgressions is considered as a robber.

2. What is considered *robbery* (*gezelah* in Hebrew), which is committed by a *robber*? This is when someone takes the money or a belonging of another person by open force – for example, if one forcibly took moveable objects away from the owner who was holding them, or if he committed any of the following types of acts in view of the owner and against the owner's will: he entered the owner's property and took away items, or he seized an animal and used it, or he ate some of the fruit that was growing there, or anything similar to these cases. One who commits any such forceful actions is considered to be a *robber*.[3]

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[1] Rambam, *Laws of Kings* 9:9.

Extortion is the act of using overbearing power or authority, or usury, to compel another person to *sell* something of value. Note that a prohibition of extortion is mentioned there, but not in regard to capital sin. This implies that no punishment is specified within the Noahide Code. The reason for this, it seems, is that within the Noahide prohibition, only outright theft brings liability for a capital sin. But for an act of theft that involves no real monetary loss (or a monetary loss so small that no one would be concerned about it; see topic 4 below), a Gentile is not liable for a capital sin.

[2] *There is a fundamental difference between a person's liability to punishment in a court, and his power to cleanse his soul from liability in the eyes of God. The sin of a Gentile thief in the judgment of God can be removed by proper repentance, but only if the stolen object is returned, or if its value is paid back when returning it intact is not possible.

[3] Rambam, *Laws of Robbery* 1:3. If someone used another person's animal, but without intention to steal the body of the animal, and instead he intended to use it only for a short time, he is considered as one who borrows without permission, which is tantamount to robbery. Nevertheless, for a Gentile, such an action would

What is considered *thievery* (or *theft*, which is *geneivah* in Hebrew), which is committed by a *thief*? This is when someone takes another person's money or belongings secretly, without the owner's awareness – e.g., one who stretches out his hand and takes money from another's pocket without the owner being aware, and any similar action.[4]

In the Noahide Laws there is no difference between theft and robbery by a Gentile. Therefore, in every place in this work or other works of Torah Law where either of these terms is used, these two types of actions are considered to carry equivalent liability for Gentiles.

3. A Gentile who forcibly takes another person's money commits robbery and is guilty of a capital sin. (The same principles apply for robbery of movable items.)

This includes one who takes his victim's money by physical threat or blackmail, saying that if it will not be given to him, he will then kill the victim or inflict harm in another manner (physically, or by embarrassment, etc.). Even though the victim then *gives* the robber or blackmailer the money by his own consent, because of the threatened harm, it is outright robbery.

There is another type of forcible acquisition of items, called *extortion* (*ĥamas* in Hebrew). This occurs when one forces his victim to *sell* him an object,[5] even at its correct value. This is similar to robbery, and it is forbidden for Gentiles to commit such acts because of the Noahide prohibition of theft.[6]

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not be a capital sin, since he does not make the owner actually lose the item, but rather only causes an indirect loss to the owner.

[4] Rambam*, Laws of Theft* 1:3.

[5] *The sin of extortion also applies if one is forced to exchange his money or take a loan on interest, or if one person pressures another to sell an item to a third party (who may or may not know the sale is forced).

[6] See Rambam, *Laws of Selling* ch. 10. There are two types of extortion:

(1) Person A pressures person B to sell him an item, until B consents and does so. B's consent (although given under duress) makes the item acquired by the buyer (A, who is the extorter). Such an act is forbidden under the prohibition of coveting.

(2) The extorter forcibly grabs the item, but then leaves due payment.

4. There is no set minimum amount for the prohibition of theft. Even if a Gentile stole the smallest amount of money *that a person would be concerned about*, he is guilty of the capital sin of theft.[7] This applies even if he stole less than the value of a *perutah* (a Hebrew term for the smallest coin in circulation – e.g., a penny in the United States).

However, if the value of the item taken is so small that *no one would be concerned about it* – for example, if one pulled a sliver of wood from another's crate or fence to use for picking his teeth – such a thing is permissible, and there is no prohibition of theft involved. Nevertheless, it is a righteous characteristic to hold oneself back from this as well.

This is only said about pulling off one or two slivers of wood, which the owner would not be concerned with at all. But if many people would come, and each would pull off one sliver, and through that the whole

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The second act is clearly theft, and the thief must return the item, since the owner never consented to the sale (even though the owner took the money that was left behind, because he was left without any choice in the matter).

The first type of extorter, on the other hand, is not obligated to return the item, and the sale is valid. As stated in fn. 1 above, all types of extortion are forbidden to Gentiles under the general category of theft. However, in regard to the first type of extortion, since the sale is valid (i.e., the owner consented to the sale in the end), there also is no liability of a capital sin for this extortion. In contrast, even though in the second case the thief who grabbed the item then left money to make a "purchase," this still does not save him from the liability of a capital sin for committing theft.

It appears that a source for the prohibition of extortion by Gentiles can be learned from the Book of Jonah. After the Gentile people of Nineveh were warned, they returned all their extorted belongings. Tractate *Taanit* 16a explains that if there was a stolen board that was built into a house, they broke up the house to remove and return the board. Meiri, on *Taanit* there, explains that the reason why they could not simply pay the previous owner for the board is that this would still be tantamount to extortion of the second type, since the previous owner whom they took it from never consented to having his item taken in the first place, even if he would be reimbursed for it later. Although it may be explained that the people of Nineveh went beyond the letter of the law in their repentance, it can nevertheless be seen clearly that to forcibly take an item and leave money for it is certainly forbidden.

[7] Rambam, *Laws of Kings* 9:9.

wooden piece would be destroyed, it is obvious that this would matter very much to the owner, and it is forbidden as theft.[8] Similarly, regarding a vessel that is made of many small pieces, such that each piece alone is not considered to have any monetary value, it is still forbidden to take even one piece from the vessel. For if many people were to come and take just one piece, the whole vessel would be entirely destroyed, and this certainly would matter to the owner.

Likewise, this applies regarding stores that provide plastic or paper bags at the check-out line for their customers' purchases: if in the eyes of the society, one such bag is not considered to have any monetary value, then the owner would surely not be concerned if just one bag were taken without permission. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to take even one shopping bag without the permission of the owner,[9] for if many people would come along and each one would take one bag without making any purchase, the owner would suffer monetary loss, and this certainly matters to him.[10]

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[8] The reason for the righteous practice of not taking a stalk of straw from a bundle is that the owner would lose his whole bundle if many people do this. Their wording implies that there is no actual prohibition for an individual to do this, within Torah Law. But it appears that this only constitutes a "righteous practice" if it is one single person who is refraining from taking the stalk, because the owner would not mind this minimal loss. But if there are actually many people involved and each one is taking out one stalk, surely the owner would mind this, and it is either theft or an extortion perpetrated by a multitude of people, which is clearly forbidden. From *Midrash Rabbah* (Gen. ch. 31), the sin of extortion of the Generation of the Flood was that a merchant would bring out beans, and each person would come and take one bean (worth less than a *perutah*) without paying, until the box was empty.

[9] *It is not sufficient to ask permission from an employee who is not authorized to decide on behalf of the owner. If one does not get proper permission to take a bag, he can avoid theft by making a small purchase.

[10] This is not comparable to the case of pulling off slivers of wood, since it is unlikely that more than one person would come and take slivers, and therefore the owner does not mind. But it is a usual occurrence for almost all of the customers to take a bag from the store for their purchases, causing an expense to the merchant, and surely the merchant would mind when people who are not buying merchandise from the store take the store's bags.

5. If a first Gentile steals something that is worth even less than a *perutah*, and a second Gentile comes and steals it from him, both of them are thieves and liable for the capital sin of theft.[11]

If the stolen item is still in its original condition, the first thief therefore has not fully acquired it (i.e., if it has not been physically changed while in the first thief's possession, Torah Law requires that he must return the stolen object itself intact to its owner, instead of making a monetary reimbursement. Still, *even in this case*, the second thief is guilty of theft.

However, if someone took a stolen item from a thief (even by robbery or theft) to save it and return it to the rightful owner, he is not liable. [He should try to do so openly to avoid the appearance of hidden theft, and he would need to prove his intent to be exempted by a court – for example, with witnesses who were told what he would do, and why.] It is surely not considered theft if the owner took his own object back from the thief.[12]

6. It is forbidden for a person to steal from another, even if the other person had previously wronged him monetarily. It is also forbidden to steal in the following cases, and each one is a thief:

(a) in order to aggravate a person, or to play a joke on him, but with no intention to keep the stolen money or item (i.e., the only intention is to temporarily pain or trick the owner, and then afterwards to return the item);[13] for this, the thief is not liable for a capital sin;

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[11] Rambam, *Laws of Kings* 9:9.

[12] For a Gentile, there is no prohibition to take one's items back from a thief.

[13] Rabbi Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg notes that there is a difference between (i) one who steals with intention to *return* the object, and (ii) one who steals with intention to *reimburse* for the object. The thief in case (ii) causes the owner to lose the actual item (even though he will not lose any monetary value), whereas the thief in case (i) intends to cause no loss, and is only forbidden to do this on a practical basis because the action is one of theft. In case (ii) the thief commits actual theft (for which a Gentile may be liable for a capital sin, unless it is merchandise ready to be sold).

In general, it seems that although there is no conclusive proof that a Gentile is liable for a capital sin for an act of theft in which there is no actual loss caused (as in the example here – because the thief did not intend to take ownership of the stolen object), it is still forbidden.

(b) robbing or stealing any item (or money) with the intention to pay back money; even if one intends to pay more than the stolen item is worth, or to replace the older stolen item with a new and better item (and the intention is for the good of the one from whom he is stealing).[14,15]

(c) stealing an item without permission in order to use it with the intention of returning it, and even with the intention to pay for the time it was used; this is considered to be one who borrows without the owner's permission, and such a person is a thief, but he is not liable for a capital sin.

There is no difference in situations (a) – (c) whether the person stole secretly or robbed openly. In either manner these are all forbidden.

7. It is also forbidden to steal from relatives or to take something of theirs without their knowledge, to use it *without permission*. This applies even if one knows with certainty that if his relative learned that he did this, the relative would be happy that he benefited in this way. As long as permission has not been given, this is forbidden as theft.

A person should not say, "I will steal and apportion the money to poor people," for this is considered doing "a *mitzvah* (meaning, a meritorious and good deed) that comes about through a sin." This is disgusting and hateful in the eyes of God, and is not considered a good deed at all.

8. In addition, one may not steal from a person who is not careful in guarding his money or other belongings. This applies even if the intention of the thief is only to teach the careless person a lesson (that he should pay more attention and be careful in guarding his belongings), and not to take something to keep for himself, but rather he intends to return it at a later time.

But if a person is not mentally or physically able to guard his wealth, it is permissible for his family members to take his possessions in order to watch them for him (even if they must be taken in a manner of theft), or to appoint a guardian who will take care of his possessions, in order that they will not go to waste (for example, in the case of a person who lost his mental abilities and is wasting his wealth). It is thus permissible for a

[14] Regarding merchandise, see topic 9 below.

[15] Rambam, *Laws of Theft* 1:2.

debilitated person's spouse or mature child to take the person's possessions (without permission and in a manner of theft) in order to guard them, if the debilitated person is not watching these things properly, and they are in danger of being lost or stolen.[16]

9. Regarding objects designated for sale (e.g., merchandise in a store), for which the manner of payment is known and recognized by the merchant and customers, it is permitted to take this merchandise and pay for it *in the accepted manner*, even though the merchant who sells it is not present and is unaware at the time. This is not considered theft (of the type discussed above in topic 6), if this is the desire and agreement of the owner. (For example, in some stores, a buyer takes merchandise and places payment money in a box prepared by the owner, even when the owner and his workers are not in the store; or the owner may appoint his employees to collect payments from the customers.)

Therefore, it is permitted to take such merchandise and pay for it with money through a second person[17] (who is trusted and reliable in the eyes

[16] It is logical that there is no prohibition of theft involved, since (e.g.) the child's intention is only to safeguard the money and possessions of his debilitated parent. Presumably the same can be said for any other person who comes with proper intentions to guard a debilitated person's possessions. This is not comparable to one who steals with intent to pay back, when the owner is in full control of his mind and is guarding his possessions. A mentally or physically debilitated person, by contrast, cannot safeguard his possessions, and therefore it is not considered theft if one tries to save those possessions and guard them. (Likewise, a custodian of a minor's funds may spend them for the minor's good as allowed by civil law.)

Rabbi Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg notes that this is obviously correct in the case where the owner is fully demented. (Regarding someone who is sane, but is just a spendthrift, it is unclear whether one may take and hold his possessions for the purpose of returning them later.)

From this it can be seen that even if a person who is squandering his money is sane, it is meritorious for another person to save the money by legal means in order to return it later. If the money is returned to the person while he is incapable of guarding it, such as a person addicted to gambling or drugs, the one returning the money is liable for any such wasteful loss. (If possible, one should seek legal permission and authority for this financial guardianship, through the

of the owner), and this is not considered theft, because he has not acted secretly, and the second person is aware of the transaction. Likewise, it is not considered robbery, because the owner willingly allows it. This is referring to a transaction conducted specifically in a public manner.

However, it is forbidden to do such things secretly in a manner that resembles theft,[18] since it may accustom a person to making transactions regularly in a secretive manner, and lead him to committing real theft.

In contrast, if a person took merchandise with the intention of paying for it, but then without permission he did not pay for it immediately, this is theft and is forbidden.[19] Similarly, if a person takes an item and pays

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civil court system. It remains doubtful that one could be allowed to steal at the outset in order to save an addict's money, or if it would only be allowed when the addict begins to make his wasteful purchase. Furthermore the obligation of returning lost objects is not a commandment for Gentiles, so this intention can't override the prohibition of theft. More clarification of these issues is needed, and situations must be considered on a case-by-case basis.)

[17] In regard to transferring a purchase payment to a merchant through his employee, we may say that the hand of the employee is like the hand of his employer, and therefore the employer (the merchant) acquires the money as soon as the employee receives it.

It appears that clearly, a Gentile merchant can receive a payment through his trusted friend who is not his employee, and (disregarding the subject of appointing emissaries) it is because the merchant obviously will consent that this trusted friend will receive a payment for him. Even if one would say that by Torah Law, the merchant has not yet acquired the money (and therefore, for example, a merchant can still retract a sale as long as the money has not entered his own hand), nevertheless, there is no issue of theft involved, since the merchant consents and trusts this process.

In addition to the logical explanation above, many Rabbinical opinions say that when one pays in cash through a third party whom the merchant trusts, it is considered a complete and finished transaction (and not a transaction on credit that requires the appointment of an emissary), even if the buyer paid for and took the merchandise without the merchant knowing.

[18] There is permission to take merchandise through paying a middleman without the merchant knowing, but only if the transaction is made honestly and openly.

[19] It is clear that the rule above (the first paragraph of this topic) specifically applies only when this is satisfactory to the merchant. But it can be assumed that

money without the merchant's awareness (inconsistently with the merchant's original intention for how the item will be sold), such an act would be forbidden as a manner of theft (similar to a person who steals with intention to pay back later, as explained in topic 6), since he is acting secretively. Furthermore, it may accustom him to paying at a later date without permission, which is actual theft.

It appears that it is forbidden to take merchandise and leave a prepared check as payment without permission, because the owner does not wish to receive checks in the same way he anticipates to be paid with cash.[20] It is obvious that the buyer is not allowed to leave his own merchandise or belongings without permission as payment for the merchandise he is buying, because a seller wants money as payment, not other items. However, if it is known that the owner agrees to a certain means of payment, by receiving a check or specific items in exchange for his sold merchandise, then it is permissible.[21]

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a merchant would not want someone to take merchandise from his store in order to pay later without his permission, for until he receives money he would not consent, and he is not interested in running after the person for the money he is owed.

[20] Regarding the case of one who put another under duress until he sold an item, such a sale is only valid when the payment is in cash, and certainly not in an I.O.U. ("I Owe You") note, since not everyone relies on an I.O.U. in the same way.

*In regard to leaving one's credit card information for payment, this would depend on the individual business. Some businesses consistently (or at some times) consider a credit card payment as equivalent to cash, or even better than cash. The deciding factor is the policy of the merchant.

[21] It appears that if the merchant trusts the check of a friend or knows that the buyer is a trustworthy person, then even when he does not usually accept checks from unknown people who come into the store, it is permissible for that trusted buyer to take the merchandise without the merchant's knowledge and leave a check, since for this person, the merchant considers his checks to be as good as cash, and the merchant is presumably happy with the sale.

10. The above law refers to a situation in which the buyer's item that is exchanged is equal in value to the merchandise that he took (in the opinion of the merchant). For not all merchants are equal in their opinion of the value of exchanged merchandise, and most want only money in exchange for a sale.

However, the buyer may intend to additionally benefit the merchant, by exchanging (through a middleman who is trusted by the merchant) an item that is greater in value than merchandise he is taking. This applies if it will bring profit to the merchant, and if it seems clear that the merchant will be happy to gain this item that is higher in value (and if this is being done specifically in a place that uses such bartering and exchanges in the markets, and buyers pay with items they wish to give to the sellers).[22] With these conditions, and if time is of the essence and the matter is pressing, or for a great need (such as a sick person who needs the merchandise for health reasons), but the owner is not present to agree to the sale and the exchange, then it is permissible for a buyer to benefit the merchant by making the exchange and leaving it in the care of a middleman whom the merchant trusts with such matters. In this scenario, there is no theft or extortion involved.[23]

However, if a person does not need the merchandise urgently and there is no pressing need, he should not take it by exchange without the knowledge of the merchant, who might not want an exchange even if it is

[22] This is logical, for regarding a matter that is a burden to a person and is not habitual, although he will profit through it, it cannot be assumed that he will consent to it. Likewise, it is clear that this also depends on the type of profit being made. For example, a merchant of clothes is not interested in selling fruits and vegetables in the market, even though he will be able to make double the profit of the clothes he sells in his store. However, it can be assumed that he consents to expend a small amount of effort in order to sell a diamond worth a thousand times his merchandise.

[23] This is only permissible when there is almost no doubt that the merchant would consent to the sale, at which point we say that he is surely benefiting from this, and it is a valid sale. If not, it is forbidden. (Therefore, permission is given for this only when it is done openly and not in a secretive manner.)

worth more than his own merchandise.[24] It is superfluous to mention that if the merchant is present, then the buyer is permitted to carry out such an exchange only with the owner's awareness and permission.

It appears that in this case (when the buyer exchanged an item of higher value than the merchandise that he took), even though it is permitted to do so (since we assume that it is for the benefit of the merchant, and therefore he would agree to it), nevertheless, if the merchant later protests when the exchange becomes known to him, saying that he did not want this exchange, then the buyer must return the merchandise that he took if he still has it intact within his possession.[25] If he no longer has it intact, then he must pay for it with money (and the item he wished to exchange is returned to him intact). But if the buyer paid for it with cash and the transaction was conducted through another person whom the merchant

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Permission is given in *Shulĥan Aruĥ HaRav*, *Laws of Found Objects* topic 5, for a household member to give food to a poor person if it is standard practice for the master of the house to allow this. It is sufficient for the master of the house to have a general knowledge and consent that this is the policy, even if he doesn't know about and consent to a specific occurrence.

In summary, a person only has permission to take a belonging without the owner's knowledge if the owner had revealed previously that in any situation, or in this particular situation, he would consent to this item being taken (such as some food from his home, or a fruit from his orchard). It is also important to consider whether the owner applies this consent to anyone, or only to some specific people.

[24] *Taz Ĥoshen Mishpat* ch. 359 follows the opinion that one cannot appropriate a credit or other benefit for another person (in such a case) without his knowledge, so unless one knows that the merchant is accepting of an exchange for his merchandise, there is a possibility of extortion involved.

However, if one leaves a proper payment of ready money in place of an item for sale, the merchant is surely happy about the sale, and this seems to be completely permissible from the outset, since it is surely beneficial to the owner (this difference is the reason for the separation of topics 9 and 10).

[25] Even though it is the rule that one can benefit another person without his knowledge, this is only based on a general assumption that the person appreciates this. But if a person protests the benefit (in this case, the exchange), it is clear that it is not considered that the acquisition was made, even if extra value was given in his favor.

trusts, the owner may not cancel the sale, for it is accepted regarding monetary transactions that if a buyer paid money and received his merchandise, it is impossible for either the buyer or the seller to cancel the transaction (without the consent of the other party).

11. There is no difference between robbery or theft that is committed against an individual, a community, or partners who share possessions. Even if a person stole something whose value was less than a *perutah* from a communal fund or from communal possessions, he is still considered a thief, and he is liable to capital punishment for the theft.

Anyone who benefits from communal funds (or from a service provided by an individual or a group of people, for which a fee is legally charged), without paying the money that is due (according to the law), has committed a "withholding of due payment" (examples are: one who withholds his employee's wages, or one who refuses to repay a dept, or one who rides in a public bus or a private taxi and then does not pay); this is the same as a thief.

12. When a person enters another's property to steal, the point in time at which he is considered a robber or thief is at the moment when he raises the object he is stealing, or when he draws the object to himself by some other means and removes it from the property of the object's owner (whether the thief brings it to his own adjacent property, or into the public domain, or into another person's private property). Therefore, if one only drags an object within the owner's property from one place to another, but does not remove it from the owner's property, and does not raise it or set it inside his own vessel, he is still not guilty of theft, and he is not liable to capital punishment.

13. The above law refers to a situation in which the thief stole an item from its owner's property, or if he stole an item that its owner had placed on the property of a third person. (Even if someone placed his belonging in the property of another person without that property owner's

permission, it is nevertheless forbidden for the owner of the property to steal that object.)[26]

However, one who robs or steals from another in the street (or in any public place that is not owned as private property) is considered a thief from the moment that he takes the object from the victim, or from the victim's container, and carries it away from the victim or places it in his pocket or inside his own container.[27]

14. If two accomplices robbed or stole, either by taking a belonging or by kidnapping, they are both guilty.

15. The prohibition of theft applies equally to one who steals from an adult or from a minor.[28]

A minor who stole is exempt from capital punishment. If a minor steals and the money or object is intact, the court is responsible to have it removed from the possession of the minor who stole it, and it is to be returned to the owner. If the stolen money or object is no longer intact, the minor is exempt from paying restitution (and his parents are also not obligated to pay for the financial loss). Even after the minor becomes an adult, he is not obligated to pay for the theft if the stolen money has been spent or if the stolen object has been lost or ruined.

Although there is no capital punishment for a minor, it is proper for a court to punish minors who steal, in accordance with their mental and physical maturity and the severity of the theft, in order that they not become accustomed to stealing or harming people in other ways.

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[26] It is unclear if this type of theft makes a Gentile thief liable for a capital sin, since the property owner is just taking an object that was placed in his property without his permission. This can be comparable to one who raises a lost object with intention to steal it, for which a Gentile is exempt from capital punishment (see *Sheva Mitzvot HaShem*, Vol. II, Part 7, ch. 15, fn. 504) since it did not come to his hand through sin. Likewise in this case, it is permissible for a Gentile to raise the object to remove it from his property.

[27] One is not considered a thief in Torah Law until he makes an acquisition of the stolen object.

[28] See *Sheva Mitzvot HaShem*, Vol. II, *Laws of Theft*, footnote 46, as to whether stealing from a minor carries liability to capital punishment.

16. It is forbidden for a Gentile to *covet* the money of other people.[29] The definition of one who covets is one who not only desires another person's belonging or his house, etc., but he also pressures the other person to sell the item to him, until the point that the owner does sell it to him (or the owner may be pressured to give it as a gift, until he finally does). Even if he gives him a large amount of money for the item, he is still considered to be one who covets.[30] However, if an object is designated for sale, and the person pressures the seller to reduce his price in the way of all buyers and sellers who haggle back and forth over a price, there is no prohibition involved.

Even if one has transgressed the prohibition of coveting, the sale is not cancelled. The one who coveted retains the object, and it is his according to the law, for the final result was that the seller was appeased, and it was not taken from him by force.

Similarly, one who pressures his friend to give him a certain gift has the status of one who covets his friend's money, and this is prohibited.

17. It is also forbidden for a Gentile to desire another person's belongings. This refers to anyone who desires his friend's house, field, vessels, or any other item (which could possibly be purchased), and he mentally plans or desires in his heart to gain that physical item.[31]

The reason for these prohibitions is that they are included in the prohibition of theft, for the result of coveting and desiring is theft.[32] (Desiring another man's wife is also forbidden, since it can lead to the sin of adultery, which is also related to theft.)

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[29] *Minĥat Ĥinuĥ* Commandment 38.

[30] Rambam, *Laws of Robbery* 1:9; *Shulĥan Aruĥ Ĥoshen Mishpat* ch. 359.

[31] Based on Rambam, *Laws of Robbery* 1:10.

[32] This reason for the prohibition of coveting is given by Rambam *ibid*. 1:11.

Therefore, it is also forbidden for a Gentile to lust after another man's wife. For even though he obviously will not be able to "acquire" her as this applies to property, it is possible that he could offer enough money to convince the couple to divorce, and he would then be able to marry her (this is the transgression of coveting, which is prohibited in the Noahide commandment of theft). The main point is that whenever there is a possibility of theft, there is also a prohibition to covet, and there does exist a prohibition of theft in regard to adultery.